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Gonor v. Dale, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 109 (Dec. 27, 2018) (en banc)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: SUBSTITUTION OF DECEASED PARTY
Summary
The Court found that the 90-day period in which a deceased party’s successor or
representative must seek to substitute for the deceased plaintiff begins when a party files a
suggestion of death on the record, not on the actual date of death. But, because appellants failed to
identify the proper party to maintain the survival action within 90 days, the Court affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the suit with prejudice.
Background
Irwin Gonor filed an intentional interference of contractual relations suit against
respondents. But, on June 2, 2016, before the case’s resolution, Gonor passed away. Without
notifying respondents of his client’s death, Gonor’s attorney engaged in settlement negotiations
with respondents at the direction of Gonor’s mother and sole heir, Shirley Hoffner. After reaching
an agreement, Gonor’s attorney returned respondent’s proposed settlement agreement with
Hoffner’s signature. Respondents became aware of Gonor’s death after inquiring about Hoffner’s
signature.
On October 26, 2016, respondents filed a suggestion of death with the district court. On
November 19, 2016, Gonor’s attorney filed a motion to amend the complaint, seeking to appoint
Hoffner as plaintiff because she was Gonor’s sole heir, or in the alternative, to allow an additional
120 days under NRCP 6(b)2 to open Gonor’s estate. Respondents then filed an opposition and a
countermotion to dismiss the case as untimely pursuant to NRCP 25(a)(1)3 and for failing to
propose a proper party for substitution under NRS 41.100.4 Following a hearing, the district court
denied plaintiff’s motion to amend and granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, finding Gonor’s
attorney failed to file a motion to substitute within 90 days of Gonor’s date of death.
On January 24, 2017, Gonor’s attorney filed a second motion to amend the complaint,
asking to substitute the estate of Gonor as plaintiff. On February 27, 2017, the probate court
appointed appellant Robert Womble as special administrator to Gonor’s estate. On March 28,
2017, the district court noted it considered the second motion to amend to be a motion for
reconsideration, denied it, and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal followed.
Discussion
NRCP 25
The district court erred in concluding that Gonor’s date of death triggered the 90-day period
to file a motion for substitution. The Court agreed with appellant that the 90-day period is triggered
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when the suggestion of death is filed on the record. A plain reading of NRCP 25(a)(1) requires that
the 90-day period begins when the suggestion of death is filed on the record.5
Further, a plain reading of NRCP 25(a)(1) details that the 90-day period is not triggered
until the party who files a suggestion of death serves the suggestion to parties and/or nonparties.
However, this Court has previously indicated that in situations where a plaintiff dies, and the
defendant files the suggestion of death, said filing of the defendant is enough to trigger the 90-day
period.6 Thereafter, the deceased party’s successor or personal representative has the responsibility
to move for substitution within that timeframe because tasking this duty to the defendant would
unfairly force the defending party to speculate on and subsequently locate the deceased party’s
successor or personal representative.7
Here, the 90-day term began when respondents filed the suggestion of death on the record
and served it to Gonor’s attorney on October 26, 2016. The remaining issue is whether Gonor’s
attorney’s two motions to amend sought to substitute the proper party under NRS 41.100.
NRS 41.100
The Court agreed with respondents that the motions to amend did not identify the proper
party under NRS 41.100. NRCP 25(a)(1) allows the court to order substitution of the proper parties.
Under NRS 41.100(1), the decedent’s executor or special administrator may maintain the
decedent’s survival action.8 Pursuant to NRS 132, the proper party who may substitute the
deceased party may either be an “executor,”9 a person named in the will of the deceased party and
appointed by the court to administer the estate, or an “administrator,”10 someone appointed by the
court to accomplish the same.
Here, the motions to amend failed to establish the proper party. Because Gonor died
intestate, the proper party would be a special administrator appointed by the court. The first motion
sought to substitute Gonor’s mother and also conceded a special administrator had not yet been
appointed. The second motion incorrectly sought to substitute the estate of Gonor instead of
substituting the proper party: the administrator of the estate.11 Further, because the 90-day period
expired before a special administrator was appointed for Gonor’s estate,12 the Court held that,
pursuant to NRS 41.100(1), appellants did not timely pursue substitution of the proper party.
Conclusion
The Court held that although the district court erred in holding that the motions to amend
were untimely based on Gonor’s date of death, its dismissal was proper because appellants failed
to timely mot to substitute the proper party. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s
holding.
5

Moseley v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 654, 659, 188 P.3d 1136, 1140 (2008).
Id. at 657, 188 P.3d at 1139.
7
Id. at 657, 661, 188 P.3d at 1139, 1141.
8
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.100(1) (2017); See also Jones v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 873 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th
Cir. 2017).
9
NEV. REV. STAT. § 132.130 (2017).
10
NEV. REV. STAT. § 132.040 (2017).
11
See Jones, 873 F.3d at 1128.
12
The Court did not consider whether the 90-day term could have been extended under NRCP 6(b)(2) if excusable
neglect is shown because appellants failed to address this argument on appeal. See NRCP 6(b)(2).
6

